30/07/2026
In 1994, an explosion at the Texaco Milford Haven refinery injured 26 people. The UK Health and Safety Executive's investigation found that in the final eleven minutes, two operators had to recognize, acknowledge, and act on 275 alarms.
One every two to three seconds.
The alarms weren't broken. There were simply too many of them, poorly prioritized, arriving faster than any human could respond. That incident became a defining case behind EEMUA 191, the guide that still defines healthy alarm-system performance today.
Here's the uncomfortable part: most commercial buildings run alarm systems that would fail every one of its benchmarks. The BAS ships with alarms "for free," nobody designs them, and twenty years later operators are ignoring thousands of notifications a day — rationally, because almost none of them require action.
Until one does.
The latest episode borrows the process industry's playbook for facilities teams:
➡ Alarm rationalization: every alarm needs a defined operator response, or it gets demoted or deleted. One published ISA case study reported an 84% reduction in alarm load.
➡Smart routing: only alarms requiring timely intervention should interrupt a person, and the critical ones should flow into your CMMS with an owner and an escalation trail.
➡ Alarm health as a KPI: track average alarm rate, floods, chattering points, stale alarms, and priority distribution — the way mature alarm-management programs already do.
Alarm fatigue isn't an operator failure. It's a design failure that operators absorb on behalf of everyone who never looked at the alarm summary.